美国路易斯安那代写:模式正义理论

Keywords:美国路易斯安那代写:模式正义理论

总之，威尔特·张伯伦的论点确实提供了一个很好的论据来说明为什么模式正义理论与自由不相容。我们首先发现，对做某事的权利的侵犯最好的描述是对做某事的自由的侵犯。然后我们认为为了避免向模式理论者提出问题诺齐克必须独立地支持绝对财产权的观点即赋予某人使用其财产的权利即使这种权利会破坏分配模式。诺齐克试图主张绝对的产权基础上的自我的想法,每个人都有权使用自己的身体,因为他们希望(包括使用它获得产权),只要他们不妨碍他人使用自己的身体,因为他们的愿望。诺齐克的洛克的但书在收购不仅关乎因为干扰定义所引起的消极权利获得财产和我们不侵犯别人的权利,财产通过收购它,因为他们只有机会获取它的消极权利和积极权利,别人不把它。关乎保证人们可能获得和使用的财产作为他们想要的,只要他们不违反他人的消极权利属性然后把枯萎的属性(钱)是一种违反他的绝对财产权利,因此违反了自己的自由。
美国路易斯安那代写:模式正义理论
In conclusion it seems that the Wilt Chamberlain argument does provide a good argument to show why patterned theories of justice are incompatible with liberty. We first identified that the violation of a right to do something is best described as the violation of a liberty to do something. Then we argued that in order for Nozick to avoid begging the question against the patterned theorist he must give independent support to the idea of absolute property rights which give somebody the right to use their property even if it upsets a distributive pattern. Nozick tries to argue for absolute property right from the basis of self-ownership which is the idea that each person is to have the right to use their body as they wish (which includes using it to acquire property rights) as long as they don’t interfere with others using their bodies as they wish. Nozick’s Lockean proviso on acquisition is not entailed by self-ownership because interference is defined only as the negative right to acquire property and we are not violating somebody else’s right to that piece of property by acquiring it because they only had the negative right of the opportunity to acquire it and not the positive right to somebody else not taking it for themselves. As self-ownership guarantees that people may acquire and use property as they want as long as they don’t violate the negative rights of others to their property then the taking of Wilt’s property (his money) is a violation of his absolute property rights and is therefore a violation of his liberty.